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COAMiIENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF LEGISLATION PROHIBITING
DISCRJIINATION IN HOUSING
Since the end of World War I, there has been a growing body of legislation
directed against discrimination based on race, color, creed, or national origin.1
Legislation in fields such as employment- and public accommodations has met
with a fair measure of success,4 and has encouraged the extension of such legis-
lation to other areas. The most recent and most controversial field attempted
to be controlled is that of private housing.5 Since private property rights are
involved, a majority of states have not yet enacted such anti-discrimination
legislation in the housing field, perhaps fearing an unconstitutional infringement
on those property rights. The small amount of legislation already adopted in
this field has yet to be tested in the courts, but if and when it is upheld such
legislation may well win widespread acceptance in those states actively seeking
to eliminate discrimination.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the existing and proposed legisla-
tion, and to determine whether it is within the state's power to regulate private
property for such a purpose, or whether it is, or would be, an unconstitutional
interference with private property rights.
PRE-LEGISLATIV En.4
Private Housing
In the absence of statute, buying, leasing or renting of private property for
living quarters has never been held to be a civil right, to be protected from
private discriminatory action." At common law a private owner could sell, lease
or rent to whomever he pleased, and could also refuse for any reason, however
discriminatory or arbitrary.7
1. Twelve states (Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnecota, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wiconsin) have
enacted some type of anti-discrimination legislation.
2. In 1945 New York enacted the first statute prohibiting discriminatory employment
practices (N.Y. Executive Law art. 15), which served as the model for statute3 in other
states.
3. E.g., New York has had such a statute for more than half a century (N.Y. Civ.
Rights Law art. 4).
4. See Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination Legislation-Experience
Under the New York Law Against Discrimination, 40 Cornell L.Q. 40 (1954).
5. New York passed the first statute affecting discrimination in private housing in 1950
(N.Y. Civ. Rights Law art. 2-A).
6. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1943); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y.
512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949). Cf. Robe-on v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
7. Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Globerman v. Grand
Central Parkway Gardens, 115 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1952), awd, 2S1 App. Div. 820, 118
N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dep't 1953); Novick v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 2c0 Alic. 694, 103 N.YS.2d
615 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 617, 107 N.YS.2d 1016 (2d Dep't 1951); Alsberg
v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 Misc. 617, 92 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1905). See also
Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 154-5 (1950).
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Many methods have been used to maintain segregated private housing areas.
For a time, one of the most widely used and most effective means was the use of
a restrictive covenant in real estate deeds, forbidding the sale or rental of the
property to certain "undesirables." These covenants proved effective until 1948,
when the Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer8 ruled that they were unen-
forceable in state courts. The Court reasoned that judicial enforcement of
such covenants constituted state action and being discriminatory, operated as
a denial of the equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.0 The
Court made it clear, however, that ".. . the action inhibited by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."'1 The Court declined to declare
the restrictive covenant illegal per se, and indicated that voluntary compliance
was not prohibited. In the later case of Barrows v. Jackson" the Supreme
Court held that a state court's award of damages for breach of a restrictive
covenant also constituted "state action" prohibited by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Together, the Shelley and Barrows decisions destroyed all legal effective-
ness of the restrictive covenant, but private owners were still free to discriminate
voluntarily.
Public Housing
Even in the absence of statute, it is clear from the Shelley case and other
Supreme Court decisions interpreting "state action"'1 2 that any housing owned
or operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions must be made avail-
able to all the people of the state on equal terms.' 3 In light of the recent
Supreme Court decision rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine,' 4 this would
seem necessarily to mean completely integrated public housing. Some states do
have legislation expressly providing for this,'5 but at the present time such legis-
lation would seem to be merely a codification of constitutional guarantees,
unnecessary in those states which have not adopted such legislation.
Public or Private?
The boundary at which "state action" ceases and "private action" begins has
not been clearly defined. In fields other than housing the Supreme Court has
interpreted "state action" quite liberally.'0 However, in 1949 the New York
8. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9. Id. at 10: "It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected
from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire,
enjoy, own and dispose of property."
10. Id. at 13. Accord, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
12. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
13. Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 (ED. Mich. 1954); Vann v. Toledo
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
14. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See also Seawell v. MacWthey,
2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (Ch.), rev'd on other grounds, 2 N.J. 563, 67 A.2d 309 (1949).
15. For example, N.Y. Pub. Housing Law § 223.
16. See note 12 supra.
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Court of Appeals, in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,17 considered the case of
a private housing corporation charged with discriminatory renting practices. The
corporation had erected a housing development on land which had been obtained
by the state through the power of eminent domain and which was then sold to
the corporation. The corporation was also given a special tax exemption on the
property for a number of years. After reviewing the Supreme Court decisions
concerning "state action," the New York Court of Appeals, by a 4 to 3 decision,
ruled that the aid given by the state did not constitute "state action," and that
the housing corporation, as a private owner, had the right to discriminate, in
the absence of any statutory prohibition.
Whether the Supreme Court would agree with this interpretation of "state
action" is debatable. However, the Court denied certiorari, so that the Stuyve-
sant Town case remains the law of New York. The immediate effect of the
case, however, was to bring about the first legislation controlling discrimination
in private housing.1
ANTI-DIscmmmATION HouSING LEGISLATION
The existing or proposed anti-discrimination legislation in the private housing
field falls into three classes, regulating: (1) all private housing; (2) state-aided
private housing; (3) federally-aided private housing.
All Private Housing
Shelley v. Kraemer and the Stuyvesant Town case made it clear that private
discriminatory practices violate no constitutional rights. Therefore, if such
practices are to be made illegal, they must be made so by legislation. At the
present time no state has enacted a comprehensive anti-discrimination housing
statute encompassing all private housing.10 However, there is a strong pos-
sibility that such legislation will eventually be adopted, and such an eventuality
would raise the basic question: Does the state have the power to adopt such
legislation, or would it be an unconstitutional invasion of personal property
rights?
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall deprive a person of
his property without due process of law.20 This does not mean that a state
cannot under any circumstances limit the use of private property, but only
requires that the state comply with due process in doing so. It is well estab-
lished that a state, in the valid exercise of its police power, may limit a person
in the use of his property, or when necessary deprive him of it entirely.2' The
17. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 931 (1949).
1S. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 18-a to 13-e were passed, requiring that state-aided private
housing avoid discriminatory practices.
19. A local law was recently passed by the City of New York, prohibiting discrimination
in the sale, rental, or leasing of privately-owned multiple dwellings (three or more families).
New York City Administrative Code, § X 41-1.0. In the past New York City leislaton in
the anti-discrimination field has served as a model for later state leglation.
20. U.S. Const. amend. X=V, § 1.
21. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. SO, 33 (1946); Blod v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135, 155 (1921) ; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 28S, 302, 150 N.E. 120, 124 (1925).
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police power is a very broad one, far transcending the power of eminent domain,
for in its exercise property may be taken even without compensation. 2 How-
ever, the police power is not unlimited, but must operate within constitutional
grounds, particularly in compliance with the due process and equal protection
of the laws clauses of the fourteenth amendment.23 Due process requires that
the legislation be not "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious," and that the
purpose intended and the means used bear a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, convenience, or general welfare.24 Equal protection of
the law requires that the statutes apply to all persons in the same category
equally, and that any classification made be on a reasonable basis.26
Private property is traditionally a field in which the state can properly exer-
cise its police power. Zoning regulations, building codes, slum clearance projects,
and emergency rent control statutes are some of the regulatory legislative enact-
ments which have been upheld as valid exercises of the police power in the
private property field.26 As the Supreme Court clearly stated in Buchanan v.
Warley,27 ". . . dominion over property springing from ownership is not absolute
and unqualified. The disposition and use of property may be controlled in the
exercise of the police power in the interest of the public health, convenience, or
welfare." 28 This is particularly true where housing is concerned, since shelter is
one of man's basic requirements, and the state, acting for the general welfare,
can exercise its power to provide adequate housing for all its citizens. As the
Supreme Court has pointed out, "housing is a necessary of life. All the elements
of a public interest justifying some degree of public control are present." 29
If a state legislature did adopt a statute forbidding discrimination in all private
housing, would the courts find "a public interest justifying some degree of public
control"? The proponents of such legislation point out that the state should
properly concern itself with providing or securing adequate housing for all its
citizens, and that many members of minority groups are compelled to live in
substandard and overcrowded housing, unable to move into better lodgings be-
cause of discriminatory practices. In the words of one statute, "these
conditions have caused increased mortality, morbidity, delinquency, risk of fire,
intergroup tension, loss of tax revenue and other evils. As a result, the peace,
health, safety, and general welfare . ..are threatened."80
22. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
23. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877); People v. Faxianger,
1 A.D.2d 92, 94, 147 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (4th Dep't 1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 393, 135 N.E.2d
705 (1956).
24. Nebbia v. New York, supra note 23; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 298, 150
N.E. 120, 122 (1925).
25. Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954).
26. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Sax], 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
27. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
28. Id. at 74.
29. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
30. N.Y. City Administrative Code, § X 41-1.0.
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Obviously, discrimination is not the sole cause of any one of the social evils
listed. At the same time, it can scarcely be denied that the practice of discrim-
ination is a contributing factor. Since the courts require only that the legislation
bear a "substantial" relation to the public health, welfare, etc., the showing of
a reasonable relation between the practice of discrimination and the social evils
sought to be eliminated would seem to satisfy the due process requirements.
The Supreme Court has indicated what its attitude towards anti-discrimina-
tory legislation, in general, might well be. In 1945, in Railway Mail Ass'n v.
Corsi,31 the Court considered a labor union's violation of a New York statuteS
which prohibited unions from excluding persons from membership solely on
grounds of race, color, creed, or national origin. The appellant union argued
that the statute violated due process, as an abridgement of the union's property
rights and liberty of contract. The Court held that due process had been
afforded the union, stating in the course of its opinion that "a judicial deter-
mination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be a
distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to
prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of
race or color."'33 Although the issue of interference with private property rights
was not so immediate or apparent as it would be in a case involving private
housing, it is significant that the issue was raised before the Court and was
disposed of by it.
Moreover, the proponents of such legislation can rely on the great leeway
given to social legislation by the courts. In determining the constitutionality of
a statute, the Supreme Court has stated that ". . . the legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of such an enactment, that every possible presumption
is in favor of its validity, and that though the court may hold views inconsistent
with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of
legislative power."'34 On another occasion the Court declared that ". . . the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation. . . ...3 Therefore, evidence of unconstitutionality
must be clear and convincing before the court will set aside an act of the
legislature.
The opponents of such a measure claim that the owner of property would be
compelled to sell, rent or lease his property against his will. This is not the
case. The statute operates only after the owner has indicated that he wishes to
sell, rent or lease, and he may still refuse to deal with persons who are undesir-
able for reasons other than those listed in the statute. However, an owner putting
his property on the market would not be allowed to discriminate solely on the
basis of race, religion, color, or national origin. Although this does restrict the
freedom of the private property owner, the only question the courts will ask is:
Is it reasonable?
Another argument frequently raised against such legislation is the loss of
31. 326 U.S. SS (1945).
32. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 43.
33. 326 U.S. at 93-94.
34. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-33 (1934).
35. Berman v. Parker, 34S U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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property values occasioned by the entrance of minority groups into a segregated
neighborhood. Obviously, where an owner sells his property to a member of a
minority group, he personally suffers no pecuniary loss, since he has the right
to obtain his asking price. Neighboring landowners, however, may in effect
suffer depreciation in property values, as well as the owner who merely rents or
leases his property. It must be recognized that the selling, renting or leasing of
property is a valid legal use, and any damage to neighboring property values is
not actionable. 36 Therefore, if the statute itself is a valid exercise of the police
power, any incidental loss suffered in complying with it is damnum absque injuria.
This was clearly pointed out by the New York Court of Appeals in considering
zoning ordinances, the court declaring that "it is not an effective argument against
these ordinances, if otherwise valid, that they limit the use and may depreciate
the value of appellant's premises. That frequently is the effect of police regula-
tion and the general welfare of the public is superior in importance to the
pecuniary profits of the individual."' 37 Moreover, in analyzing the reason for the
drop in property values, it is apparent that it is caused by the very discrimina-
tion against which the statute is aimed. Once discrimination was overcome, and
all neighborhoods were integrated, such property loss would no longer occur,
since there would be no segregated areas to which to move, and property values
would attain their true value.
It is further argued that it is wrong to make people associate socially with
others when they do not wish to do so. 3 8 This, however, is clearly not the purpose
of such legislation, just as social mixing is not the purpose of integrated schools.
The purpose of the legislation is tp provide adequate housing on an equal basis
to all citizens, as the purpose of integrated schools is to provide equal educa-
tional facilities for all. Although greater contact between groups does necessarily
result, no person is compelled to associate with any other on the social plane,
to take him into his home, his club, or even his church.
It seems clear, therefore, that legislation proscribing discriminatory practices in
the sale, rental, or leasing of all private housing would be a valid exercise of
the state police power. Private property rights must, when necessary, yield to the
public need, for ". . . government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use
his property to the detriment of his fellows. . . .Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest."3 0 Of
course, factors other than constitutionality must be considered in determining
the need or wisdom of such legislation. That is the proper function of the state
legislatures. However, if such legislation is carefully framed and adopted, it
should be capable of withstanding constitutional attack.
State-Aided Private Ilausing
The first important existing legislation in the housing field was passed as a
result of the Stuyvesant Town decision. When the New York Court of Appeals
held that a private property owner receiving state aid could practice discrimina-
36. Stratton v. Conway, - Tenn. -, -, 301 S.W.2d 332, 333 (1957).
37. Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 302, 150 N.E. 120, 124 (1925).
38. Avins, Trade Regulations, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 149, 157 (1957).
39. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
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tion with impunity, it spurred the New York Legislature to action. In 1950 the
equal right to publicly-aided housing was declared to be a civil right 40 pro-
tected by the state constitution. 41 The statute provided that any private owner
who receives aid from the state in the way of tax exemption, or by the state's
sale of land below cost, or the state's sale of land which it has obtained by con-
demnation proceedings, cannot discriminate in the rental or leasing of such
property. A person injured by such action can bring an action for equitable
relief, or sue for damages.2
Although the statute has not yet been challenged in the courts, its validity
does not need to rest on the police power issue. Since the state is under no duty
to offer such aid, it would seem that as a condition to the granting of aid the
state can exact any reasonable conditions to the acceptance of that aid. One
condition is that the donee of the grant will not engage in discriminatory prac-
tices. The private owner is not compelled to accept the aid, but if he chooses to
do so he must comply with the condition.
Federally-Aided Private Housing
In 1955 the New York anti-discrimination statute was amended to include, in
the definition of "publicly-assisted housing," housing financed by loans guaran-
teed or insured by the federal government.43 This amendment, known as the
Metcalf-Baker law, is now being challenged on constitutional grounds, as an
unconstitutional interference with the operation of the federal law, and as a
denial of equal protection of the laws.&"
The federal government itself has set no policy requiring non-discrimination
as a condition to the granting of FHA aid. Therefore the state law cannot be
upheld on that ground. If the statute is valid, it must be as a proper exercise
of the police power.
The first argument raised against the statute is that it interferes with the
operation of the federal law, and that where the two collide, the federal law is
supreme. However, for a federal law to invalidate a state law a clear conflict
must be shown.m45 The federal statute makes no provision at all as to discrim-
ination-therefore there is no express inconsistency. But, it has been argued,
40. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ IS-a to 13-e.
41. N.Y Const. art. I, § 11 provides: "No person shall, becamuse of race, color, creed or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state."
In Green v. New York, 251 App. Div. 103, 110, 295 N.Y. Supp. 672, 674 (4th Dep't 1937),
the court stated that . . . 'civil rights' as distinguished from rights which are naturally
inherent, are those defined and given by positive law enacted for the maintenance of
government.'
42. Equitable relief is obtained under N.Y. Executive Law § 297; punitive damages are
recoverable under N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 41, which also makes a violation of the statute
a misdemeanor.
43. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 1S-b; N.Y. Executive Law §§ 290, 292, 296.
44. The constitutionality of the Metcalf-Baker law was upheld in a recent lower court
proceeding. New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments,
Inc., 139 N.Y.L.J. No. 13, p. 13, col. 1 (Sup. CL Jan. 16, 1953). An appeal is expected.
45. Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).
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the state is adding conditions to the granting of federal aid, and therefore in
effect is hindering its operation. However, this is not the only example where
state legislation might be said to condition federal aid. The state has building
codes, fire laws and zoning regulations, which it can change at will, and which
must be complied with in constructing and rehabilitating housing, whether built
privately or with FHA aid. Clearly Congress did not intend that in providing
such aid the states would be deprived of their traditional power to regulate the
use of property within their boundaries, and that FHA insured housing would be
exempt from state law.
A second argument advanced is more persuasive. As this Comment has
shown, the state does have the power to adopt anti-discriminatory legislation
controlling all private housing. However, in the exercise of that power the
state must treat equally all property owners in the same category. Where a
classification is made, it must be a reasonable one, and not arbitrary or capri-
cious. 46 New York and New Jersey47 have chosen to regulate discriminatory
practices among private property owners receiving federal aid, but not other
private owners. Is such a classification reasonable?
New York adopted the Metcalf-Baker law in light of the Federal Housing
Act of 1954,48 which provided for large-scale assistance to private owners in the
rehabilitation of existing housing and the construction of new housing. Evidence
was introduced before the New York Legislature showing that FHA insured
housing previously constructed in New York City had been occupied on an
almost completely segregated basis.49 The proponents of the measure considered
it to be only a first step in progress towards the elimination of discrimination
in all housing, but reasoned that it would be easier to integrate in new and
rehabilitated housing first, rather than to try to integrate all housing at once,
particularly housing already occupied on a segregated basis.
It remains to be seen whether the courts will consider such reasons sound
enough to support the classification made by the legislature, or whether the
classification will be held to be a denial of equal protection of the laws. The
Supreme Court has stated that "equal protection does not require identity of
treatment. It only requires that classification rest on real and not feigned
differences, that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which
the classification is made, and that the different treatments be not so disparate,
relative to the difference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary."5 0 It has
also pointed out that a state is not ". . . prevented by the equal protection
clause from confining its 'restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed to be clearest.' "51
The classification and control of new and rehabilitated private housing apart
from already built and occupied housing would seem to have a reasonable basis.
As a practical matter, integrating new and rehabilitated housing is a much easier
46. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
47. N.J. Stat. Ann. 18:25-9.1 (Supp. 1957).
48. 68 Stat. 590 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
49. 1955 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 274-76.
50. Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954).
51. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942).
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process than integrating already occupied housing. There is no prior pattern of
segregation to overcome; no economic menace to the landlord by threats of
moving on the part of tenants opposing the admittance of minority groups.
However, the Metcalf-Baker law goes even further than this. It controls only
that portion of new and rehabilitated housing insured by the FHU. Since the
federal government sets down no requirement as to discrimination, it is difficult
to see why the state should differentiate between housing insured by the federal
government and housing insured by private insurers or not insured at all. It
might be argued that the federal aid comes out of each taxpayer's pocket, and
therefore the state has an interest in seeing that its citizens' money is not mis-
used, but this would seem to be more properly the province of Congress.
Therefore, even though the state would seem to have the power to regulate
private housing in general, the use of that power in the Metcalf-Baker law
would seem to be somewhat arbitrary. Granting this element of arbitrariness,
it is still difficult to predict that the statute will be held unconstitutional. Once
the general power to regulate is found, the courts have looked with disfavor on
invocations of the equal protection clause, requiring the statute to be "wholly
arbitrary."5 2 Justice Holmes, rejecting such a claim, declared: "It is the usual
last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort.
But the answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can,
indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within
the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow."a 3
CONCLUSION
In the adoption of legislation-particularly social legislation fraught with
highly emotional issues-other factors than constitutionality must be considered.
Is such a law necessary? Is it wise at the present time, or will it only stir up
tension? How is it to be made enforceable? Should a violation be a civil or
penal offense, or both? Who shall administer the law? These are just some
of the questions legislators must ask themselves in considering such legislation.
Those states which have already adopted legislation in the discrimination
field have attempted to answer some of those questions. Generally, the admin-
istration of the statutes has been placed initially in the hands of an administra-
tive body, rather than in the hands of the courts.rc These administrative bodies
attempt to stress the conciliatory rather than the penal approach to the problem,
and seek voluntary compliance if a violation is found after a hearing on the
validity of the charge made against the property ownerY0 Usually penal
sanctions are also available, where conciliation fails."0
52. See note 50 supra.
53. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 20S (1927).
54. In New York State the administrative body is the State Commission Against
Discrimination (SCAD).
55. In New York the procedure is governed by N.Y. Executive Law § 297; judicial
review is granted by § 29S.
56. For example, N.Y. Executive Law § 299 provides that willful resistance or interference
with the enforcement of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail,
and/or a $500 fine.
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